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TS No. 186369/64/B

16 June 1964

DCI BRIEFING FOR THE HOUSE
APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

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(NB: entire package requires about 43 minutes.)

*Updated for 18 June meeting
with Vinson Subcommittee*

DCI BRIEFING FOR THE
VINSON SUBCOMMITTEE

SOVIET MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

- I. WE have just received preliminary assessments of the first half of our latest coverage of the Soviet Union. It strengthens our belief that the USSR suspended new construction starts for ICBM sites in the middle of 1963.

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- II. The slowdown may be accounted for by the fact that two new Soviet ICBM missile systems are far enough along in research and development so that one of them may be ready for deployment early next year.

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
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
IV. The 6,300-man UN peace-keeping force has been maintaining a tense truce.

A. Its three-month mandate expires late this month. It will be extended, and the terms of reference may be interpreted more liberally to enable the UN troops to take more positive action to enforce the peace.

V. There is practically no prospect, however, for any early solution of the basic problem.

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DCI BRIEFING FOR THE
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

LAOS

- I. In Laos, the shaky coalition system which was patched together by the 1962 Geneva conference has broken down completely, and the Communists are on the move again.
 - A. The Pathet Lao launched their drive on May 16, following Souvanna's decision to oust left-leaning neutralists from the coalition cabinet.
 1. Although prepared well in advance, the attacks may have been set off by Premier Souvanna's determination to reshuffle the cabinet despite repeated Pathet Lao warnings against such a move.
 - B. The major fighting was over in a very few days. Kong Le's neutralist forces put up little resistance before withdrawing to the hills west of the Plaine des Jarres. Personnel losses were slight, but weapons losses were considerable.
- II. The timing of the attack may have been determined by the disorganization of anti-Communist forces

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following the April 19 coup. As to its purpose, it is our best judgment that the Communist intent was probably to restore the status quo ante in regard to territory held, dating back to the Geneva Accords in 1962 when the Pathet Lao considered the Kong Le neutralists to be in their camp.

- A. In point of fact the Communists now hold roughly the area controlled by the combined Pathet Lao and neutralist forces after Geneva, and the present offensive has not pushed beyond that area.
- B. In the political context, the Pathet Lao probably hope that this demonstration of power will strengthen their hand in any future bargaining sessions with the non-Communists.

III. The Pathet Lao drive in the Plaine des Jarres was preceded by major moves against rightist guerrillas and regulars operating in the mountains to the east.

- A. The Communists dislodged Meo guerrillas from key mountain positions in this area, where the Meos had been harassing and interdicting Communist supply movements along Route 7 from North Vietnam. More recently, Meo positions south of the Plaine have also come under attack.

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B. Elements of three right-wing battalions east of the Plaine have also been routed with major equipment losses.

IV. The Pathet Lao have 19,500 troops, supported by an estimated 9,100 Viet Minh advisors and troops. (The 9,100 figure is the DIA estimate; CIA is more inclined to say 5 to 7,000 Viet Minh.) (DIA - 9100)

A. With Viet Minh support, the Pathet Lao could readily overrun the rest of Laos against the present non-Communist strength. Lao troops have an almost superstitious fear of the well-equipped Viet Minh units.

1. The Pathet Lao themselves have better leadership and higher esprit de corps than the government forces, but are almost totally dependent on North Vietnam for heavy weapons support and for logistics.

B. The rightists have 50 to 60,000 men, and Kong Le commands about 7,000 neutralists. (Many compromised) These troops are US-equipped, but they have seldom fought well against the Pathet Lao. Recently the government troops seem to have derived some psychological lift from the bombing and strafing missions being flown by the expanded Laotian Air Force with fourteen T-28's.

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C. These T-28 strikes, as a matter of fact, are proving increasingly effective, and offer the possibility, if not countered, of causing enough disruption of the Communist command and logistics to impede any major new offensives. — Anti aircraft could

stop these attacks

← (background on US strike, opposite)

US involvement — a) recon - unarmed
b) escort c) suppressive fire.

V. Premier Souvanna's vacillation last week on the question of fighter protection for the photographic missions implies that his long-range hope for Laos is still that both East and West will leave the country alone to work out its own destiny.

A. The Communists, however, have been charging in their propaganda ever since the attempted rightist coup of April 19 that Souvanna is a prisoner of the rightists and a puppet of the Americans. Souvanna, whipsawed between the rightists and the Communist propaganda, obviously has little hope that the old tripartite coalition can be restored, let alone made into an effective government.

VI. We feel that the Communists would still prefer if possible to maintain the unwieldy tripartite system, not as an end but as a means. It has enabled them in the past to claim a veto right over Western aid.

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- A. It has never prevented them from nibbling away at non-Communist positions, while they refuse to submit their own area to coalition control.
- B. We have indications that the Pathet Lao, against the likelihood that the coalition cannot be restored, are making preparations for their own allegedly neutralist government in Pathet Lao territory.
- C. If they announce such a government, the Pathet Lao might at the same time intensify their military operations. We believe, however, that they would probably try to keep the fighting below the level which they calculate might provoke direct US intervention.

VII. Souvanna is ready for an international conference, but his conditions are that the Communists must first withdraw from territory they have taken since May 16, and that the Laotian representation should be that of the royal Laotian government. Both conditions are probably unacceptable to the Communists.

- A. Souvanna's main hopes from any international conference would be a stronger International Control Commission, and broader powers as premier.

VIII. The Poles, with Soviet support, have suggested a conference of the UK and USSR as co-chairmen, Canada, India and Poland as ICC members, and the three Laotian factions. This of course would leave out Communist China, and Peiping is insisting on the full 14-nation meeting.

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1 - Vietnam & Laos

2 - Cyprus

3 - Congo

4 - Cuba

5 - USSR - China

DCI BRIEFING FOR THE
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

VIETNAM

- I. The picture in South Vietnam remains bleak.
 - A. General Khanh has not yet firmly consolidated his position and has not yet been able to show any concrete progress in the country's counterinsurgency effort.
- II. The Viet Cong still hold the initiative throughout most of the country.
 - A. The Viet Cong guerrillas are steadily eroding government control in the countryside by the effective application of terrorism. This takes the form of harassing fire, assassinations and kidnappings, coupled with small-scale attacks, sabotage, and propaganda.
 1. These guerrilla actions are supported by elements from the Viet Cong hard core units, consisting of an estimated 25,000 regulars who are well-armed with recoilless rifles, mortars and machineguns.
 - B. The regulars mount occasional large-scale attacks or ambushes in company or battalion strength for psychological effect.

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1. In mid-April a force of at least two Viet Cong battalions engaged government troops in an unprecedented five-day battle.
- III. The government's position is most ^{serious} critical in the densely-populated provinces around Saigon and at the mouth of the Mekong River, and along the coastal plains in the north of the country.
- A. The Khanh government has stepped up both large-scale and small-scale operations against the Viet Cong, but its effort is showing some lag in the past few weeks.
1. Most of the government's larger operations are one-shot search-and-clear efforts, ^{These however} which inflict little lasting damage on the enemy. ~~Only~~ ^{Eight} continuing clear-and-hold operations, which are the key to pacification, are presently underway.
 2. One of these, in the northern part of the country, is reporting substantial results, but few of the 11 critical provinces closer to Saigon are even holding their own in pacification efforts.
- B. Continued deterioration of the government's military posture is indicated by an increase

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in government casualties of approximately 30 percent in the past six months, compared to a decrease of about three percent in Viet Cong casualties. Weapons losses still favor the Viet Cong.

- C. Government desertions have also risen since last November; a total of 27,000 deserted in the first four months of 1964 ^{almost} compared to ~~three times the 1963 experience~~ ^{over a} 36,400 in all of 1963. ^{4 mo. period.}

1. Most of these desertions are from the paramilitary forces, which bear the brunt of the fighting and have been most directly affected by the local disruptions from two government changes in Saigon. By and large, the deserters do not go over to the Viet Cong, but just go home or take to the hills.

- D. Government ^{inability} failure to meet its conscription and recruiting quotas has compounded the attrition of its armed strength. Many regular combat units are at only 55 percent of authorized strength.

1. General Khanh is trying to remedy these problems through mobilization, pay raises, promotions and new training, ~~but it remains~~ questionable whether he can meet ^{his} goal

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of putting another 147,000 men under arms
by October *seen as attainable.*

IV. Political considerations continue to hamstring Khanh's efforts to invigorate the government's military and administrative performance.

- A. Frequent reshuffling of local officials (including nearly all of the 43 province chiefs since November), inadequate guidance and support from Saigon, and the retention of some incompetents with powerful backing are retarding provincial pacification efforts.
- B. Khanh has begun training courses to overcome the shortage of administrative talent at all levels, but the government remains plagued by bureaucratic rivalries and bottlenecks and by overlapping functions.
- C. Civilian cabinet ministers, particularly but not exclusively members of Deputy Premier Hoan's ambitious Dai Viet Party, are increasingly complaining about their lack of authority, and about the privileges and irresponsibilities of the country's top generals.
- D. There are signs of rivalries and cliques among some key military officers, and their real loyalties to Khanh remain questionable.

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1. Increased dissension, and renewed rumors of coup plotting, indicate that any "honeymoon period" the Khanh regime may have been granted by political and military rivals has ended. Khanh apparently intends to reorganize the government soon to appease some troublemakers and eliminate others.
 2. The recent release of four arrested generals of the preceding junta was aimed at removing one divisive factor among the military, but these officers and former junta leader General Minh are ~~still on the shelf~~ and likely to remain troublesome.
- E. Religious tensions, aggravated by extremist Buddhist criticism of Khanh and by growing uneasiness among Catholics, may pose new threats to the stability of the government.
- V. Border clashes with Cambodian forces and the deteriorating situation in Laos are also complicating South Vietnam's fight against the Viet Cong.
- A. There is no doubt that South Vietnamese forces crossed the Cambodian border at least twice last month in pursuit of Viet Cong troops, which use Cambodia as a sanctuary and as a point for infiltrating supplies.
- B. Communist gains in southeastern Laos, together with Hanoi's intensive efforts to improve land

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routes in lower North Vietnam and into Laos, are increasing Hanoi's potential for more direct aid to the Viet Cong.

- VI. North Vietnam is definitely concerned over the possibility of armed attacks on North Vietnam. North Vietnamese officials have scoffed at speculation that the US may launch such attacks, and have boasted that North Vietnam could crush any attempts. Nevertheless, a number of defensive measures have been taken against such a contingency.
- A. There is a lot of trenching activity around major cities, apparently to provide personnel shelter in case of air attack. Antiaircraft facilities have been emplaced around key installations, and security has been tightened at major airfields.
- B. There is a vigorous effort to rebuild the coastal rail line from Hanoi to the demarcation line, repairing sections destroyed during the war with the French.
- VII. The Hanoi regime has had serious agricultural and industrial shortages during the past three years, but it appears stable and fully capable of maintaining the guerrilla wars in South Vietnam and Laos--or even expanding them slightly.

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- A. We do not yet have a clear picture of the prospects for the important summer harvests in North Vietnam, but the regime announced recently that they would be the best since 1960.

VIII. Ho Chi Minh, now 74, appears to be vigorous and still in unchallenged control of his country.

- A. When he dies, there could be a power struggle between extremist and moderate wings in his party.
- B. Ho has favored the more militant pro-Peiping elements of the party during the past year.
- C. The regime has not, however, gone as far as Peiping in attacking the Soviet Union. North Vietnam depends on both China and the USSR for political and economic support, and would prefer to see the whole Sino-Soviet dispute swept under the rug.

Actions - Strengthen K Gout as possible

- 1 - Intensify our own efforts
- 2 - Work directly with provinces and district chiefs - US/EVN teams
- 3 - Extensive massive effort to win public SVN support Kham Sat
- 4 - Restore 1962 accords in Laos

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DCI BRIEFING FOR THE
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INDONESIA - MALAYSIA

- I. Philippine President Macapagal is making a major effort to convene first the foreign ministers and then the chiefs of state of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines in Tokyo this week to resolve the Malaysian dispute.
 - A. Indonesia and Malaysia finally agreed yesterday on the procedures for establishing checkpoints along the border in Borneo, where inspectors from Thailand are to verify withdrawals of Indonesian guerrillas from the Malaysian part of Borneo.
 - B. Neither the Malaysians nor the Indonesians, however, expect that the summit meeting will be able to achieve a solution even if the leaders meet to discuss the problem.
- II. Sukarno of Indonesia has agreed only that there will be an "initial withdrawal" of an unspecified number of guerrillas, with further action dependent on the progress of the summit talks.
 - A. The Malaysians and their British supporters are rightfully suspicious that more guerrillas are being moved into Malaysian Borneo for the sole purpose of being marched out past the checkpoints.

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B.

after the original date set for the summit talks, Gurkha forces in Borneo fought a battle with a group of Indonesian infiltrators attempting an incursion.

C. We believe Indonesia has at least 200 and perhaps twice that many guerrillas, including regular army personnel, inside Malaysian Borneo at the present moment.

1. The figure has been as high as 700 to 800, but the guerrillas have had difficulty sustaining themselves, and over the past month the Indonesian emphasis has been shifting to sabotage and terror operations directed against Singapore and mainland Malaysia.

2. This does not represent any weakening of the Indonesian resolve to crush Malaysia. Djakarta apparently feels that a wave of terrorism on the mainland is more likely to win concessions from the Malaysians.

II. Indonesia is using Communists among the Overseas Chinese residents in Malaysia for its covert and guerrilla operations.

A. On the mainland, Indonesia has contact with the Malayan Communist Party, predominantly Chinese, and with several other leftist parties of Chinese.

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B. In Borneo, the Indonesians have trained and sent back into Malaysian territory an estimated 500 members of the so-called Clandestine Communist Organization, a well-organized Chinese group estimated to have 3,500 to 4,000 members and up to 20,000 sympathizers.

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DCI BRIEFING FOR THE
VINSON SUBSOMMITTEE

CUBA AND THE SOVIET FORCES

I. In Cuba, we appear to be witnessing the turn-over of the surface-to-air missile system from the remaining Soviet forces on the island to the Cubans.

A. We have good evidence that at least those SAM sites in the central and eastern of the three Cuban military sectors have already been turned over.

1. [] photography, for instance, shows that some of the SAM sites in the central sector which have just been relocated have none of the Soviet-type tents at their new locations.

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2. In the past 10 days two Soviet ships have sailed from Santiago de Cuba with substantial personnel aboard, probably from the SAM sites at the eastern end of the island.

B. Eight Soviet passenger ships have called at Cuban ports since the beginning of May, and have withdrawn about 3,000 Soviet military personnel. At least two other ships, en route or scheduled, could remove another 1,000 passengers by the end of July.

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1. We have evidence for the arrival of no more than 150 passengers in these eight ships, making it clear that the reason for the extra sailings is to carry passengers from Cuba to the Soviet Union.

II. We have been estimating since last winter that there were some 4,000 to 7,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba, inclining more toward the upper range of 7,000.

A. When the bulk of the surface-to-air missile crews go home, there probably will be only a few thousand men left behind as trainers, technicians, and advisers.

III.

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the Cuban crews were

supposed to be ready in May, after which only five Soviet technicians or officers would remain at each site.

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
IV. All the evidence indicates that under present circumstances the Soviet Union has no desire for such an incident. They certainly must recognize that we would retaliate for any interference with our overhead reconnaissance.

A. The attendant possibility of escalation would be particularly embarrassing if not perilous for the Soviet Union because of its ambiguous but persistent propaganda promises to stand by the Cubans in the event of any new incidents with the United States.

B. In this light, we interpret the campaigns undertaken by Havana and Moscow against our U-2 flights as an effort to bring international pressure to bear on us. The Soviets not only asked the Danish Prime Minister to warn us, on his recent visit to the United States, that the U-2 flights were risky business, but have also conveyed a couple of Khrushchev hints that we must surely be doing well enough with satellite photography so that we don't need the U-2 any more.

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- A. We use every available source and facility to check these reports out very carefully.
- B. Many of them can be attributed to the presence of defensive or tactical missiles and launchers.
- C. There are always a few of these reports which cannot be resolved with anything like certainty. The intelligence community takes a long hard look at these, but in no case have we found enough substantiation to conclude that there exists in Cuba a strategic missile capability against the United States.

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DCI BRIEFING FOR THE
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THE MIDDLE EAST

I.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] begin drawing up a balance

sheet on Khrushchev's recent visit to Egypt.

A. On the surface, it was a successful public appearance tour, with a tireless Khrushchev cheering the Egyptians on against the Israelis and the imperialists, promising the UAR another \$280 million in development credit, and taking bows for completion of the first stage of the Aswan High Dam.

B. Behind the scenes, however, we understand that Nasir was disappointed over his inability to get hard currency instead of ruble credit; riled by Khrushchev's advocacy of proletarian rather than Arab nationalist revolution; and dissatisfied with Khrushchev's lukewarm support against Israel in the final communique.

1. Arif, the Iraqi strong man of the moment, came to Cairo to join the talks, but apparently got nothing but a dressing down from Khrushchev for the persecution of

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domestic Communists.

2.

there should be Communist participation in the UAR government, a Soviet complaint Nasir has always ignored.

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II. With or without hard currency, Nasir can use the Soviet credit. The Egyptian economy is still his most serious long-term problem. Most Western countries are reluctant to give Egypt any more credit, and he has very little foreign exchange.

A. The IMF has just granted a loan of \$30 to \$40 million, but it is conditioned on revisions of some UAR economic policies. The State Department is considering an additional loan of about \$20 million.

B. For domestic reasons Nasir is unlikely to accept the full Western recommendations for reduction of his overambitious development plans.

III. Nasir recently has been avoiding anti-American pronouncements of the type that stirred up the fuss over Wheelus Air Base in Libya last winter.

A. The UAR propaganda guns at present are trained on the British, trying to keep the unrest stirred up along the poorly defined border

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between Yemen and the British-protected South Arabian Federation.

1. Nasir has increased Egyptian subversion and sabotage against Aden, but he is not likely to risk a direct confrontation with the British.
2. The UK in turn has launched a vigorous military campaign to clean up the Yemen border area, and will probably allow more aid to reach the Yemeni royalists across the frontier as a reprisal.

IV. In Yemen itself, neither side has been able to gain any decisive advantage in the prolonged guerilla fighting.

A. Nasir's troop strength in Yemen remains at its peak of about 40,000, but his men and the Yemeni republicans cannot control the mountainous back country.

B. On the other hand, the royalists don't have the strength to confront the Egyptians in the population centers and lowlands.

V. The announcement last month of steps toward "unity" by Iraq and the UAR is not likely to be followed by much substantive action.

A. Joint political, military and economic committees are to be formed, but we doubt that

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anything resembling true unification is in
the works.

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VI. The controversy over Israel's Jordan River project has touched off a new storm in Arab-Israeli relations.

- A. The Israelis have begun pumping small amounts of water from the Jordan basin. This is just a test, but the full project is to go into operation some time this summer.
- B. The Arabs are frustrated because they have no feasible way to stop the project. They have discussed diverting the Jordan headwaters, but have made no tangible progress.

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DCI BRIEFING FOR THE
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BRAZIL

- I. In Brazil the Castello Branco government is beginning to tackle some of Brazil's thorniest political and economic problems.
 - A. Humberto Castello Branco, the former Army Chief of Staff and a key figure in the revolt which threw out President Goulart at the beginning of April, is serving out the presidential term which Quadros won and Goulart took over. A new president is to be elected in October 1965, and inaugurated in January 1966, although some elements are urging that elections be postponed at least one year.
 - B. So far, Castello Branco impresses us as a hard-working moderate sincerely dedicated to building democracy and prosperity in Brazil.
 1. His cabinet is composed of generally prominent, well qualified, and respected ministers ranging from the center to the moderate right.
 2. The new government, moving ahead with reform plans, has already taken some measures to reduce inflation. At a rate of 8 percent a month under Goulart, this is probably Brazil's most serious problem.

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3. Some needed reforms, such as the recent end to government subsidies on wheat, petroleum, and newsprint imports, have been and will be politically unpopular.

C. The suspension of the political rights of former President Kubitschek has caused only a very mild reaction within Brazil, compared to the sharper impact abroad. His removal from the political scene, on grounds of corruption during his presidential term from 1955 to 1961, should facilitate unification of the government and a start on genuine political reform.

II. The nationwide drive against Communists, other extremists, and corrupt officials is expected to continue, but the regime's extraordinary powers to suspend political rights and cancel electoral mandates ended June 15.

A. In most areas, the pace of the drive has slowed down, and most of the thousands arrested at the start have been released.

B. Many Communist leaders are still in hiding, but leftist peasant leader Juliao was caught recently. Goulart and his anti-American brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, are in Uruguay.

III. In the foreign policy field, the Castello Branco government appears to be solidly pro-Western.

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- A. Brazil broke relations with Cuba on May 13.
- B. President Castello Branco and his individual cabinet members appear to be strong friends of the US; the prospect for good US-Brazilian relations has not been brighter for a good many years.

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DCI BRIEFING FOR THE
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THE CONGO

- I. The Congo appears to be headed at a minimum for a period of increasing instability, and possibly toward a complete breakdown of governmental authority.
 - A. The thorniest problem is the two-month old rebellion in the province of Kivu Central. A relatively small tribe has defeated and demoralized a succession of Congo army units, and now threatens the provincial capital of Bukavu. The rebellion is largely ethnic but has political overtones, and possibly some support from Chinese Communists in Burundi.
 - B. The other open rebellion, by Pierre Mulele, a leftist trained in Peiping, has been going on for six months in Kwilu Province. It is relatively inactive now except for sporadic skirmishing, but the government still has not restored control over a considerable area. The Kwilu rebellion tied down four army battalions.
 - C. The longer these rebellions go unchecked, the more likely they are to touch off other outbreaks. The list of vulnerable areas includes Stanleyville, the Kasai region, Katanga, and Leopoldville itself.

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II. While the UN has been in the Congo, there has been some improvement in the Congo Army, but it is still not an effective force.

A. The army retraining program, largely under Belgian supervision, has so far given appreciable training to only one of the 20-odd battalions.

1. Belgium, [] plans to have 200 officers in the Congo by the end of the year, but less than half of them have arrived. Both Brussels and the Congolese are reluctant to put them at battalion level, where they are most needed.

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B. U Thant appears determined to get UN troops out of the Congo by the end of June. There has been only unproductive discussion of bringing in an all-African force to replace the UN, recruiting European officers, or recruiting and training a completely new army from the ground up.

III. The unpredictable Congolese parliament has been sent home to give Adoula a breathing spell. Its mandate expires June 30, at which time President Kasavubu will appoint a new provisional regime to govern for six to nine months pending new elections.

A. It is by no means certain that Kasavubu will ask Adoula to be the formateur, and even if he does, at Belgian urging he may insist on a broader government.

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- B. The Belgians would still like a spot in the government for Tshombé, who has about 3,000 of his former Katanga gendarmes encamped across the border in Portuguese Angola.
- C. There is no cohesive political party to support the Adoula government or its successor, and the central government has never had more than tenuous control over the 21 provinces.
- D. Under the circumstances, Adoula **has to worry** not only about the rash of rebellions, Tshombé, and whether he will be asked to form a new cabinet, but about the "Committee of National Liberation" in Brazzaville, and his own colleagues.
- E. Both the Soviets and the Chinese Communists have been giving covert help to the mixed bag of exiles, largely Gizenga and Lumumba followers. So far, however, this help has been limited and of little effect, largely because the exiles are so inept and so divided.

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DCI BRIEFING FOR THE
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

AFRICA

I. While our immediate attention is focused on the Congo, I must list a number of other African trouble spots we must continue to watch:

- A. The new United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar so far is a union in name only. Pro-Communists on the island continue to work either to undo or to eviscerate the union, retaining a strong bloc presence which by now has almost completely eliminated British advisors and technicians. The supporters of the pro-Communist Zanzibar Foreign Minister, Babu, still dominate a small army receiving Soviet training and weapons.
- B. In the Horn of Africa the Somali Republic, encouraged by some \$35 million in promised Soviet military aid, is likely to continue its irredentist guerrilla campaigns against both Ethiopia and Kenya.
- C. Southern Rhodesia, with 220,000 whites and 3.8 million Africans, could explode if the

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present all-white government succeeds in cutting itself loose from the UK with a constitution preserving full white control.

- D. In the Republic of South Africa, Verwoerd's regime is stable, prosperous, and fully capable of suppressing any internal disorders. Its exiled opponents now are concentrating on calls for effective international economic sanctions. This would cause fewer problems for South Africa than for the US and UK, which are involved in about 35% of South Africa's foreign trade.
- E. Portuguese Africa is contending with armed rebellions in two of the three "overseas provinces," but Lisbon shows no sign of softening its determination to hang on. The Angola rebellion is bogged down; that in Portuguese Guinea, however, has denied the government control of substantial hinterland areas.
- F. In Algeria, President Ben Bella's increasing espousal of pro-Soviet policies may bring on an open power struggle with such rivals as Defense Minister Boumedienne. Ben Bella's opponents are still badly divided, but the

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Algerian leader appears increasingly nervous
about the chronic dissidence in the Kabylie
mountains east of Algiers.

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